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Abstract
While the theoretical literature maintains that strategic coordination is one
of the keys to successful rebellion, anti-governmental campaigns are not nec-
essarily synchronized across rebel groups in observed civil wars. To resolve
this discrepancy, we develop a dynamic and spatial model of rebellion that
illustrates patterns of contagious challenges against a government. As bat-
tles evolve, more rebels are inclined to "bandwagon," joining the ongoing war
because the government is gradually revealed to be weak and because accu-
mulated challenges shift the balance of power away from the government. Our
theory also addresses why rebel movements often spread across the periphery
and can eventually reach the heartland as if a siege shrinks. We delineate four
geographic patterns of rebellion and then classify into them the Yugoslav Wars
and other historical incidents.
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1 Introduction
When two political factions commonly confront an oppressive, and possibly despotic,
sovereign, they naturally seek the possibility of pact or alliance to aggregate and
leverage their power. Even when it is hardly possible for either faction solely to defeat
the sovereign, the chances increase substantially if the two factions cooperatively
synchronize their anti-sovereign campaigns. Weingast (1997) interprets such rebel
strife as a coordination problem, whose solution necessitates a mechanism to limit
the government and thus constitutes an integral component of the rule of law. As the
theory applies to the masses, strategic coordination becomes even more critical for
citizens, since power is much more sparsely distributed across the general populace
than elites. Fearon (2011) generalized Weingasts two-player coordination game to
many-player settings. He maintains that the very role of democracy is to render
citizens the opportunity to coordinate their protests and create social consensus about
when to replace the ruler, while criticizing other accounts of democracy for the lack
of functional appeal (Przeworski 1991; Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, 2001; Boix
2003).1 On very similar grounds, both Weingast and Fearon presume that anti-
governmental strife can hardly thrive without strategic coordination across rebels or
protesters. The Glorious Revolution, for instance, is an archetypal historical incident
supportive of Weingasts theory in that the expulsion of James II owed heavily to
the compromise between the relatively loyal Tories and the disobedient Whigs. In
the international context, the American Revolution constitutes another incident of
coordinated rebellion, where the thirteen colonies acted in unison to secede from the
British regime. A close scrutiny on other rebel movements, however, suggests that
strategic coordination is not necessarily a prerequisite for success in anti-governmental
strife.
In the dismantling of former Yugoslavia during the past few decades, for instance,
there was no formal alliance among separatist minorities to ght hegemonic Serbia.
Although separatists of various ethnic groups deed the common threat from Bel-
grade, they did not synchronize their challenges (except for the simultaneous Slovene
and Croatian declarations of independence in June 1991). Instead, the pattern of
the Yugoslav wars unfolded as a series of ethno-specic challenges, which gradually
1According to Fearon (2011), an electoral outcome with free speech functions as a public signal
to arrange social consensus.
accumulated as the wars proceeded. Slovenias inclination toward independence, as
proclaimed by the 1990 referendum, initially spurred Croatia to exit the Federa-
tion.2 Subsequently, galvanized by Slovenias decisive victory in the Ten-Day War,
Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and nally Kosovo ensued with
substantial time lags, resulting in the breakup of Yugoslavia as a sovereign state.3
With the exceptions of Macedonia and Montenegro, whose secessions incurred no or
little casualties, these separatist movements resulted in a gradual escalation of wars
between the hegemonic Serbs and several ethnic minorities.
A similar pattern of spreading challenges can be seen among inter-state wars, too.
By 1811, Napoleonic France established her dominance on the European continent,
and most parts of the continent once fell under her control. However, durable re-
sistance in the Iberian peninsula inspired Russia to leave the France-led coalition
by transgressing the Continental Blockade or an economic sanction on Frances con-
sistent rival Britain.4 Napoleon mobilized the Grande Armée to suppress Russia
in 1812, but his failed invasion and futile retreat provoked further challenges from
Prussia, Sweden, and Austria, leading to Napoleons abdication in 1814.
These patterns of anti-hegemonic challenges share the same feature of multi-party
war illustrated by Blainey (1988):
General wars began simply as wars between two nations. Other nations
were later drawn in. A general war was thus a series of interlocked wars
happening simultaneously. In the growth of a general war the entry of
additional nations was often like the sherman who intervened while the
waterbirds fought, or waterbirds who pounced while the sherman slept
(p. 232).
In other words, a series of bilateral wars overlap and escalate into a multi-party
war. Although Blaineys illustration does not focus on war between a hegemon and
its multiple adversaries, it casts doubt on simultaneity in challenges stressed by Wein-
gasts and Fearons models. Mirroring Blaineys illustration, Haldi (2003: 159) insists
2Croatia seceded in part because the Federation without Slovenia would frame the Croats as a
minority beneath the Serbs (Fearon 1998: 126).
3To be precise, Kosovo has declared independence twice since 1991. The rst attempt was on
October 1991, and the second on February 2008. Inspite of these attempts, Kosovos sovereignty
has not yet been internationally recognized.
4Before Russias transgression, Austria also exploited turmoil in the Iberian peninsula by invading
Bavaria, but the plot ended in an utter failure.
that alliances cannot explain the widening of wars because most of alliances are formed
during conicts, not before them.
To delineate this sequential pattern of war between a government (a hegemonic
state in the international context) and several rebel groups (vassal states), we de-
velop a dynamic model, which incorporates into the standard coordination game the
following three features: (i) two social groups (players) are uncertain about the gov-
ernments strength; (ii) battle outcomes are unpredictable due to the "fog of war"
(Clausewitz [1832] 1976); (iii) these groups are heterogeneous in terms of resolve and
strength. Built upon these features, our theory holds that rebel challenges may not
simultaneously arise because either group opportunistically chooses the side it belongs
to, contingent upon the tide of battles between the government and the precedent
rebel group. Namely, either group may remain to acquiesce the government until the
reports from battle elds convincingly indicate that the government is so weak that
the challenge is worthwhile.5 We formally theorize this decision-making process by
the Bayesian method, based on the models three features mentioned above.
From another point of view, for a rebellion to break out without strategic coordi-
nation such as alliance, there must be an "instigator" (or a leading political unit) who
has the resolve and strength to solely challenge the government even without other
partiesguaranteed military support. Our theory maintains that the instigator can
inspire other discontent parties by demonstrating the governments weakness through
his own insurgent campaigns and also by shifting the balance of power in rebelsfa-
vor.6 As the instigators battles evolve, others may "bandwagon," joining the ongoing
rebellion, depending on the instigators military performance. This endogenous and
gradual formation of a social agreement to demolish the status quo is overlooked in
existing models, which commonly treat the social consensus as exogenously assumed.7
On the contrary, if there is no instigator or a party with outstanding resolve and
strength, then those discontent with the status quo may seek prewar alliance. Due to
5Technically, an opportunistic partys decision to join an ongoing rebellion depends mainly on
the following two factors: (a) the chance to defeat the government jointly with the precedent rebel
group; (b) the risk of being defeated by the government. As the precedent rebel group resists the
governments suppression, the government is gradually revealed as weak, so that factor (a) dominates
(b) in some time period, spurring the opportunistic party toward war.
6In our theory, no particular rebel group is exogenously appointed to be an instigator, but he
endogenously emerges in equilibrium.
7For instance, Weingast points out a charismatic leaders role in creating social coordination such
as an elite pact or inter-ethnic coalition, but he remains silent on the issue of how a leader can bring
about the coordination.
the lack of an instigator, no battle takes place before the formation of alliance, and
neither is the governments strength revealed. Alliance thus conditions that all its
participants are willing to collectively ght the government even when not knowing
the governments strength, though none of the participants is strong enough to initiate
ghting alone. Our theory therefore implies that rebel groups are likely to coordinate
their challenges if they are homogeneous in terms of resolve and strength and that
such a coordination is less likely if they are heterogeneous. The former implication is
consistent with Weingasts (1997) and Fearons (2011) theories, both of which assume
homogeneity among rebel groups.
We further deliver geopolitical implications. Because it is more di¢ cult for a gov-
ernment to suppress rebels far away than nearby (DeRouen and Sobek 2004; Fearon
2004), an instigator plausibly nests in a remote area or beyond geographic safeguards.8
The general direction of rebellion spreading among multiple rebel groups is therefore
inward. Namely, in light of three or more rebel groups, a rebellion initiates at a
geographic fringe and then spreads across peripheral areas. Once the government is
besieged by rebels in the periphery, those in the rimland may join the ghting. As
the war further escalates, this siege gradually shrinks and can nally reach the heart-
land. This pattern of geographic di¤usion can be conrmed in the Yugoslav Wars,
the Napoleonic Wars, the American Civil War, and the Boshin War (Section 5). De-
pending on the possibility of alliance, one of the following four patterns of rebellion
expansion may emerge: (i) a snowballing rebellion, which gradually escalates as more
challengers are drawn in (Napoleonic Wars); (ii) a catalytic rebellion, where a sole
instigator provokes a galvanizing event to inspire all otherssimultaneous challenges
(Boshin War); (iii) a partially coalitional rebellion, which is initiated by a subset of
ex post rebels (American Civil War, Yugoslav Wars); (iv) a fully coalitional rebellion,
for which all the rebels act in unison (American Revolution, Glorious Revolution).
The rest of this article proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section
3 presents and solves the dynamic and spatial model of rebellion. Section 4 illustrates
four patterns of rebellion expansion and addresses when each of them is likely to
emerge. Section 5 connects our theory to historical incidents. Section 6 concludes.
8Using the Napoleonic Wars as examples, Clausewitz ([1832] 1976: 527) illuminates this dimin-
ishing property of force. Boulding (1962: 58) also introduces a similar concept in his words "loss of
strength gradient."
2 Literature Review
There are plenty of theoretical studies on why war begins (Fearon 1995; Powell 1999)
and how it ends (Wagner 2000; Filson and Werner 2002; Slantchev 2003; Powell 2004;
Fearon 2007) in dyadic environments, but few theoretical investigations have been
devoted to how war expands, perhaps due to the di¢ culty of modeling multilateral
wars (Jackson and Moreli 2011).9 We tackle this issue by focusing on a particular form
of war war between a hegemon (government) and its challengers (rebels).10 Formal
modelling of this form of war is particularly relevant to civil-war studies because one of
the unique features of civil war is that while a government is hierarchically organized
and can act as a single decision-making body, rebels are often decentralized and
occasionally too disorganized to adopt collective tactics.
There are at least two major approaches to formally theorizing multiple-party re-
bellion. One is to treat it as a collective action problem (Olson 1965: 105-110), which
holds that citizens lack the incentive to join rebellion although they could depose a
tyrant if they acted collectively. The other is to treat it as a coordination problem
(Weingast 1995, 1997, 2005; Fearon 2011), according to which social groups or citi-
zens are willing to participate in rebellion only when others also participate (except
for the mixed-strategy equilibrium). Neither theory can explain why rebellions (or
wars against a hegemon in the international context) often evolve only gradually.
The theory of collective action fails because of individualsunwillingness to sacrice
their private interests for collective ends. The theory of social coordination also fails
because according to it, a rebellion breaks out only when rebels mount challenges
simultaneously, not sequentially. In our theory, on the other hand, after someone
provokes a rebellion, the incentive for others to join the ght against the govern-
ment is nourished as battles continue since lengthy ghting implies the governments
inability to promptly suppress the rebels. Put another way, our theory describes
the transition of the models payo¤ structure from the collective-action type to the
social-coordination one by Bayesian learning.11
9Reiter (2003) surverys the bargaining theories of war.
10In this sense, contagion in civil war examined in this article is internal all rebels challenge the
same sovereign and should be distinguished from external contagion where rebel movements spread
across states (Lake and Rothchild 1998).
11In contrast, Weingast (1995, 1997, 2005) reconciles the two theories by side payments: a sovereign
may appease one of her subjects by transfering payo¤ in order to fractionalize and weaken the rebels.
Drawbacks of Weingasts model are summarized in the online Appendix A (available upon request).
3 Model of Rebellion
We provide a dynamic and spatial model of rebellion, illustrating a situation where
two political units individually choose (not) to ght their common adversary. The
model can apply to at least three political contexts: (i) a separatist war in which
ethnic minority groups challenge their host state in order to secede from the status
quo regime;12 (ii) a revolution in which political parties or economic classes rise in
revolt against the sovereign; (iii) an inter-state war in which vassal states take up
arms against the suzerain state to seek greater autonomy.
3.1 The Models Structure
In the model, there are two social groups (i 2 f; g) that are discontented with the
status quo maintained by the government. In the rst period t = 1, each of the two
groups decides to "ght" or "acquiesce" to the government. Also, in subsequent pe-
riods t = 2; 3; : : : ; any group that has not yet fought the government decides whether
to ght or not. If group i chooses to ght, inicting a lump-sum cost ci, the battle
results in one of is "win," "holdout," and "loss" in that period, depending on the
governments (later-specied) military strength G relative to the rebels. If i "wins"
("loses"), the war ends with is one-shot gain wi (loss li). If i "holds out" in a battle,
the war continues to the next period. The payo¤ from "acquiesce" is normalized to
be zero.
Once a group starts ghting, it cannot withdraw its army, and the battle evolves
until the group "wins" or "loses" the war (Figure 1).13 In other words, a groups de-
cision is when to ght or permanently acquiesce. On the other hand, the government
is assumed not to make any strategic decision; i.e., the government is committed to
suppressing rebellion to preserve its sovereignty.14 The game continues until every
groups battle ends decisively with a "win" or "loss."
12Ethnic groups decide to secede or not quite strategically (Walter 2006a).
13Our model does not allow the possibility of negotiated settlement between the government and
the rebels because the government risks its legitimacy if it openly negotiates with the rebels (Licklider
1995).
14Walter (2006b; 2009) explains a governments resolve to suppress rebellion by its reputational
concerns: if the government settles a deal with a separatist group, other ethnic minorities would
become skeptical of the governments resolve and capabilities, and thus their separatist movements
would escalate. In a similar context, Alt et al. (1988) conducted a theoretical investigation on a
hegemons strategic decision to build its reputation. Our model, by contrast, assumes away the
governments counter-insurgency problem and focuses on rebelsstrategic interdependency.
Figure 1: Group is decisions and paths.
3.2 Spread of Information
The model captures the uncertainty of the governments strength. The two groups do
not know the governments true strength g, which is binary: low or high (g 2 fgL; gHg
with gL < gH), but they know the prior probability distribution Pr(g).
Each group i is given a parameter ri, which denotes is strength or robustness. On
the ground that rebels nesting in remote areas or beyond geographic safeguards are
naturally di¢ cult for the government to repress ("diminishing force of the attack"
Clausewitz [1832] 1976: 527; "loss of strength gradient" Boulding 1962: 58), ri is
possibly associated with is such safeguards. Based on this presumption, we seek the
models geographic implications toward the end of the article.
A battle outcome depends on the governments relative military strength:
G  g  
X
i2f;g
Iiri for g 2 fgL; gHg;
where Ii is an indicator which is zero if group i acquiesces or has fought but lost
the war (i.e., Ii = 0 for is "acquiesce" or "loss"), while it is one if i is ghting the
government or has won the war (Ii = 1 for is "win" or "holdout"). This means that
as more groups challenge the government, the balance of power shifts away from the
government, but it shifts back if a rebel group is defeated.
Each of the two groups is assumed to be weaker than the government.
Assumption 1 For i 2 f; g, ri < gL.
Given the relative strength G, "nature" determines group is battle outcomes in
period t (hijt 2 fwin; hold; lossg) with the following restrictions: (i) neither group
can solely defeat a strong government; (ii) rebels are more likely to win (both a per-
period battle and the entire war) if they are stronger; (iii) a war is more likely to
be prolonged if military capabilities between warring parties are closer. The power
balances perfectly when G = 0.
Assumption 2 For i 2 f; g, (i) Pr(winjGLi ) > 0 and Pr(winjGHi ) = 0, where GLi
(GHi ) denotes the governments relative strength if i is ghting the government with
strength gL (gH). (ii) Both Pr(winjG) and Pr(winjG)
Pr(win[lossjG) decrease with G until they
reach zero.15 (iii) Pr(holdjG) decreases with jGj.
When both groups are simultaneously ghting the government, they are assumed
to operate the same campaign; namely, the two groupsbattle outcomes are identical
probabilistic events (hjt = hjt).
Once either group initiates war, the other group infers the governments true
strength g from a series of reports from battle elds. For instance, if  holds out
the rst battle (denoted as holdj1),  updates its belief as to the governments low
strength by Bayesrule:
Pr
 
gLjholdj1

=
Pr
 
gL

Pr(holdjGL)
Pr (gL) Pr(holdjGL) + Pr (gH) Pr(holdjGH )
=
1
1 + Pr(g
H)
Pr(gL)
Pr(holdjGH )
Pr(holdjGL)
:
More generally, s belief based on s battles until period T can be shown as:
Pr
 
gLjhjT

=
1
1 + Pr(g
H)
Pr(gL)

Pr(holdjGH )
Pr(holdjGL)
T 1 Pr(hjT jGH )
Pr(hjT jGL)
; (1)
where s history is (holdj1; holdj2;    ; hjT ).
Lemma 1 For i 2 f; g, (i) Pr  gLjwinijT  = 1 for any T  1, and (ii) Pr  gLjholdijT 
increases with T .
15An implicit premise in (ii) is that Pr(holdjG) > 0 regardless of G.
Proof. By Assumptions 1 and 2, Pr(winjG
H
i )
Pr(winjGLi )
= 0 and Pr(holdjG
H
i )
Pr(holdjGLi )
< 1 in Equation (1).
The interpretation of Lemma 1 is straightforward: (i) a rebel groups "win" reveals
the government to be weak; (ii) an indecisive battle implies that the government does
not possess the su¢ cient military capability to promptly police the rebel group. As the
rebel group persists, the other group further lowers its estimate of the governments
strength. This transition of the estimate can inuence a potential rebel groups
prospect of war and thus its decision to ght the government.
3.3 Mutual Inuence Between Rebel Groups
In the current two-player setting, the following two patterns of rebellion can be con-
sidered. In one, two groups rebel in sequence.
Denition 1 A rebellion is uncoordinated if it is initiated by group  and later
joined by group , depending on s battle outcomes.
In the other, two groups rebel in unison.
Denition 2 A rebellion is coordinated if it is provoked simultaneously by  and .
Below we focus on uncoordinated rebellion, for which the initial rebel group is
denoted as  and the other as . (The issue regarding the pattern and sequence of
challenges will be tackled in Section 3.5.)
To analyze the playersincentives, we derive their expected payo¤s from ghting.
When  decides to challenge the government or not, it counts on s possible rein-
forcement. Anticipating s reinforcement after T -round battles,  rationally initiates
rebellion in the rst period if its expected payo¤ in Denition 1 is positive:
V Ij1 (T ) 
X
g2fgL;gHg
Pr (g)
 
TX
t=1
Pr (holdjG)t 1  (G) + Pr (holdjG)T  (G;)
!
 c; 16
(2)
16G; denotes the governments relative strength when it simultaneously ghts  and .
where i (G) for i 2 f; g is is per-period payo¤givenG, and i (G) is continuation
payo¤:
i (G)  Pr (winjG)wi   Pr (lossjG) li
i (G) 
1X
t=1
Pr (holdjG)t 1 i (G) :
Equation (2) shows that V Ij1 (T ) consists of per-period payo¤s before s reinforce-
ment, which occurs in period T + 1, and payo¤s in and after T + 1, indicating that
s decision to ght hinges critically on the timing of s participation (T + 1), the
likelihood of s survival until s participation (Pr (holdjG)T ), and the signicance
of s military support (r = G;  G).
On the other hand, if  rebels in period T + 1, s expected payo¤s conditional
on s T -period battle outcomes hjT 2

winjT ; holdjT ; lossjT
	
are:
V IjT+1
 
winjT
    GL;  c
V IjT+1
 
holdjT
  X
g2fgL;gHg
Pr
 
gjholdjT

 (G;)  c
V IjT+1
 
lossjT
  X
g2fgL;gHg
Pr
 
gjlossjT

 (G)  c;
where the government is fully revealed as weak when  "wins" (Assumption 2-(i)),
and it is more likely for  to defeat the government when  "holds out" than when
it "loses" (G; < G). Based on its latest estimate of the governments strength, 
deliberately decides to ght or not.
If s rational decision is independent of s battle outcomes or the governments
relative strength, an additional report on s battles does not contribute to s better
decision-making, so that it makes no sense for  to learn from s ghting. For the
governments relative strength to inuence s decision, we reasonably impose the
following restrictions on preferences:
Assumption 3 (i) Jointly with ,  is willing to ght if the government is weak but
unwilling if it is strong; i.e., 
 
GH;

< c < 
 
GL;

. (ii) Without s assistance,
 is unwilling to ght even the weak government; i.e., 
 
GL

< c.
By Assumption 3-(i), s victory provokes  toward the rebellion, and s rational
decision during s ghting is conditional on the latest estimate of the governments
strength. (Without this assumption,  might "ght" or "acquiesce," regardless of
s battle outcomes.) By (ii), s defeat dampens s willingness to challenge the
government.
3.4 Timing of Bandwagoning
To solve the model by backward induction, we rst derive lagged challenger s timing
to join initial challenger s rebellion and then nd the condition for the rebellions
outbreak.
While s rational decision can be derived immediately from the comparison of
payo¤s between "ght" in the rst period and "acquiesce" permanently, s decision
analysis is not so straightforward. In fact, what  chooses is not just whether to
ght or acquiesce in a period but also when to rebel if it does so. Positiveness of
the expected payo¤ from ghting (V IjT+1
 
holdjT

) does not necessarily rationalize
s decision to ght because  can be better informed of the governments strength
by postponing the decision as long as  is holding out. Therefore,  must assess the
relative merit and demerit of ghting today and waiting to make a better decision
tomorrow.
If s battles do not convey enough information about the governments strength,
 would not postpone its ghting for the informational advantage. We rule out such
an uninteresting case by imposing the following restriction on the prior distribution
of g:
Assumption 4 The prior probability that the government is strong is so large that
at least one period of acquiescing is worthwhile to  or that
Pr
 
gL

Pr
 
lossjGL
  

 
GL;
  c < Pr  gHPr  lossjGH   c     GH; :
(3)
Without Assumption 4,  would immediately ght, implying that the two chal-
lenges would occur simultaneously in the rst period. The assumption also suggests
that the e¤ects of acquiescing in a period are twofold: if  is solely defeated by the
government,  can avoid the risk of erroneously challenging the strong government by
abandoning ghting (expressed in the right-hand side of Inequality (3)); however, s
defeat also deprives  of the chance to subvert the weak government jointly with 
(in the left-hand side). The comparison between these gain and loss from acquiescing
determines the optimal timing of s bandwagoning.
Lemma 2 Suppose group  initiates a rebellion. (i) Once  "wins,"  immediately
challenges the government. (ii) If  "loses,"  acquiesces forever. (iii) As long as
 "holds out,"  acquiesces until period T and then joins s rebellion, where T is
the smallest T which violates Inequality (3) with Pr
 
gLjholdjT

and Pr
 
gH jholdjT

instead of Pr
 
gL

and Pr
 
gH

, respectively.
Proof. Assumption 3 trivially rationalizes s decisions in (i) and (ii). The proof of
(iii) appears in the Appendix.
As s battle continues, s estimate of the governments strength gradually
declines (Lemma 1), so that  becomes less likely to erroneously challenge the strong
government, while more likely to waste the opportunity to defeat the weak govern-
ment jointly with . In other words, as  acquiesces longer, the gain from acquiescing
gradually disappears, while the loss becomes more substantial. Thus, lengthy battles
between the government and  induce  to attack the government before  is fully
disarmed. In period T,  nds it no longer worthwhile to postpone ghting, and 
then joins s rebellion.17
This simple analysis might explain why rebel movements spread sequentially and
contagiously, not simultaneously. Once group  provokes rebellion, group  starts
speculating on the governments true strength. As  waits longer, it will become
more informed of the strength. Once  realizes that the government is su¢ ciently
likely to be weak, it will participate in the rebellion. For  to take up arms, a
certain length of time might be needed. Our theory explains this lagged participation
in rebel movements by initial challenger s durability in battles and the time for
informational spreading.
From a technical standpoint, uncertainties both of the governments strength and
of battle outcomes are necessary for the time lag in ghting between the rebel groups.
If it were almost certain that the government is weak, rebels would have no reason
to postpone ghting and challenge the government simultaneously, as in Weingasts
(1997) model. In fact, Weingasts model is equivalent to ours with deterministic battle
outcomes (i.e., no "fog of war"): Pr (winjG;) = 1; Pr (lossjGi) = 1 for i 2 f; g.
17The dynamic of s incentives is illustrated in a numerical example in Section 3.6.
3.5 Outbreak of Rebellion
When rebels conspire against a government, they may strategically coordinate their
challenges by forming a coalition to ensure success. However, due to lack of com-
munication channels caused by factors such as long-lasting hatred, mutual distrust,
disparity in value systems, or geographic hindrance, strategic coordination is not
always an option among rebels.
The proposition below suggests that a rebellion can break out even in light of such
communicational obstacles if there exists an "instigator," or leading rebel , which is
so strong and resolved that it can provoke the other group  toward rebellion.
Proposition 1 Even without strategic coordination, a rebellion can break out as ini-
tiated solely by group  if and only if it is so strong and resolved that V Ij1 (T)  0,
where T is of Lemma 2.18
Proof. The proof is straightforward and thus is omitted.
We next incorporate into our model the process toward strategic coordination
specied as follows. Before the rebellions onset, each group is given the option to
propose a collective campaign to the other. If a proposal is placed by a group and
accepted by the other, they mount a collective rebellion in the rst period. Otherwise,
they make their decisions to ght or not individually.
The following proposition shows that rebels do not necessarily synchronize their
challenges even if such coordination is an option.
Proposition 2 With the means to coordinate their challenges, the two groups ght
the government simultaneously if and only if no group is so strong and resolved to
solely initiate a rebellion in the sense that V Ij1 (T)  0, where T is of Lemma 2, but
both of them are resolved enough that min

V II ; V
II

	  0, where V IIi for i 2 f; g
is is expected payo¤ from joint, simultaneous ghting (Denition 2):
V IIi 
X
g2fgL;gHg
Pr (g)i (G;)  ci:19
18The outbreak of uncoordinated rebellion hinges on strong military (large r) and unyielding
resolve, which consists of obsession for victory (large w), fearlessness of defeat (small l), and little
cost of ghting (small c). Among these factors, only a strong military can inuence  toward
ghting. Even when  proclaims rebellion,  is unlikely to be drawn in if  is not strong enough to
durably resist the governments suppression (or if Pr (holdjG)T is not so large).
19The two groups would also simultaneously challenge if neither group has the incentive to acqui-
esce or if Assumption 4 fails.
Proof. If V Ij1 (T)  0,  would delay ghting or T  1 (Assumption 4), so it must
be that V Ij1 (T)  0. For simultaneous "ght" to be at least as good as permanent
"acquiesce," it must also be that min

V II ; V
II

	  0. These conditions are su¢ cient
as well as necessary.
For a rebellion to be coordinated, all participants must possess the willingness to
ght simultaneously even at a sizable risk that the government is strong. A coordi-
nated rebellion also requires that there is no group outstanding in terms of resolve
and strength because if there is, the other group might be better o¤ by delaying its
challenge. In this regard, rebel movements might not be so conventionally synchro-
nized as previously considered. To say the least, the means of coordination does not
guarantee its adoption. On the contrary, an uncoordinated rebellion requires an in-
stigator who is willing to initiate ghting even without the other groups committed
reinforcement. Propositions 1 and 2 thus imply that a coordinated rebellion is more
likely to break out if rebel groups are homogeneous in terms of resolve and strength
and that an uncoordinated rebellion is more likely if they are heterogeneous.
From geographic point of view, the model also suggests that an instigator is likely
to nest in areas free from the governments inuence or beyond geographic or cli-
matic safeguards on the presumption that rebels in these areas are di¢ cult for the
government to police promptly (plausibly with a larger r). While the instigator
holds out, rebels in areas closer to the government are incited to be drawn in. Thus
an uncoordinated rebellion may spread from geographic fringes to the center of the
state. As explored in Section 5, this pattern of contagion can be observed commonly
in Yugoslav Wars, Boshin War, American Civil War, Napoleonic Wars.
If there is no instigator  such that V Ij1 (T)  0, a rebellion can take place only in
a coordinated manner in equilibrium. If there is only one instigator, a rebellion takes
place even without strategic coordination, and the sequence of ghting is uniquely
determined in equilibrium.20 If both groups are resolved and strong enough to serve
as an instigator, multiple equilibria emerge. In this situation, either group can initiate
ghting. However, given that rebels with dispersed power naturally face di¢ culties
with overthrowing a government, the multiplicity, rather than scarcity, of instigators
would not be of importance.
20Trivially, the strategy prole by which both groups acquiesce permanently forms a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium on the ground that neither believes the other ever rebels. We rule out such an
equilibrium by imposing the sequential rationality on lagged challengers o¤ the equilibrium paths.
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Figure 2: Strategic interdependency between the two groups.
3.6 Numerical Example
The strategic interdependency between the two groups is illustrated in Figure 2, where
 is stronger and more resolved than : w = 12; l = 3; c = 1; r = 7; w = 8;
l = 3; c = 1; r = 3; g
L = 8; gH = 12; Pr
 
gL

= Pr
 
gH

= 1
2
; Pr (holdjG) = 99
100
exp

  jGj
100

; Pr (winjG 2 [0; 5)) = Pr (lossjG 2 ( 5; 0)) = 1
200
exp

  jGj
2

: It can be
seen in (a) that  would not rebel if s reinforcement is too late (T > 37). In (b),
as s battle evolves (or as T rises), s gain from acquiescing falls while the loss
rises. Right after the 15th round of s battle when the government is revealed likely
enough to be weak,  will join s rebellion, that happens with probability 0.593. An
uncoordinated rebellion becomes impossible when c = 3, with which the coordinated
rebellion takes place.
4 Four Patterns of Rebel Expansion
In this section, the model is extended to incorporate three discontent groups (i 2
f; ; g).
4.1 Denitions
Whereas observed rebellions often involve more than three groups, this three-player
setting su¢ ces to portray the following four general patterns of rebellion. (With-
out loss of generality, we label rebel groups from the rst  to the last  in Greek
alphabetical sequence.)
Denition 3 A rebellion is snowballing if it is initiated solely by  and then joined
by  and even later by .
Denition 4 A rebellion is catalytic if it is provoked by  and then amplied simul-
taneously by  and .
Denition 5 A rebellion is partially coalitional if it is waged jointly by  and  and
later entered by .
Denition 6 A rebellion is fully coalitional if all three groups ght simultaneously.
In scenarios involving more than three groups, even more complicated patterns
may emerge, but they still fall into some combination of these four patterns.
4.2 Analysis
Below we investigate the players incentives and informally delineate the condition
for each pattern of rebellion to emerge.21
As in the two-player game, analysis of the initial rebel s incentive is straightfor-
ward:  is willing to challenge the government if it expects  and s reinforcements
likely and reliable enough. Also as in the two-player game, the last rebel  chooses to
bandwagon when its predecessor(s)  (and ) reveal the government to be su¢ ciently
weak. On the other hand, s decisionmaking is more complicated when  decides
the timing of ghting, it takes into account the following two conicting factors: the
possibility of s defeat and the timing of s participation. If  ghts earlier,  is
more likely to survive, but  must endure longer until s reinforcement. In contrast,
if  delays ghting, it can anticipate s reinforcement soon, but  is more likely to
be defeated alone. By comparing these relative merits and demerits,  determines
the timing of ghting.
Depending on the distribution of power across the government and the rebels
(g; r; r; r) as well as on the rebelsresolve (wi; li; ci for i 2 f; ; g), one of the
following four patterns of rebellion may emerge:
21The formal analysis of this three-player model is lengthy and technically tedious. We thus leave
it in the online Appendix B (available upon request).
 A snowballing of rebel movements is most likely when the three groups are
heterogeneous in terms of strength and resolve; the rst group () is outstanding
to lead the rebellion; the second () also overpowers the third (). Put more
concretely, in period one, while  is willing to ght, the two others are not;
also in some later period, while  is,  is not. The rebellion then escalates in
sequence, generating a snowball e¤ect.
 A catalytic rebellion may take place if one group () is outstanding in strength,
while the two others ( and ) share similar propensities for ghting. When 
provokes the rebellion,  and  are unwilling to take up arms even jointly with
others. However, as the rebellion evolves, they update their evaluation of the
governments strength, convincing themselves that the challenge is worthwhile
if the other also rebels. The coordination dilemma then a­ icts them. After a
certain length of s battles,  and s joint challenges in any period can be in
equilibrium. In light of such multiple equilibria, the instigator  would be eager
to generate Schellings (1960) focal point a catalyst in order to assist  and 
in coordinating their challenges. For instance, the instigator would bring about
a galvanizing event such as establishing its legitimacy or garnering international
recognition in order to implicate a larger population into the rebellion.
 A partial coalition is sought by a pair of groups ( and ) that are unwilling
to solely challenge the government but willing to jointly do so. Depending on
 and s success in their campaigns, the last group () may also rebel.
 A full coalition is most likely the power is distributed equally across the three
(;  and ) in the sense that no sole group or pairwise coalition is willing to
ght, but all three prefer collective challenges to permanent subordination.
These predictions are consistent with the theoretical literature in their claim that
strategic coordination is required for the outbreak of a rebellion across homogeneous
groups, but we deliver an additional claim that even without strategic coordination,
a rebellion can break out if there is an instigator who is resolved enough to mount a
challenge and is strong enough to convince others to join the rebellion.
4.3 Geographic Implications
The discussions above indicate that power distribution across rebel groups can inu-
ence the pattern of rebellion: (i) a stronger and more resolved group tends to ght
earlier; (ii) groups with similar strength and bellicosity tend to ght together. In ad-
dition, by interpreting ri as the extent to which i is protected by geography (Section
3.2), we can elicit inferences on how geographic factors matter for the rebel pattern.
Put concretely, since a rebel farther away from the government is harder to repress
(with a larger ri), it can be inferred: (i) a group farther away from the government
tends to ght earlier; (ii) groups in similar geographic relations to the government
tend to ght together.
To deduce these inferences, a rebellion is likely to break out in a geographic fringe;
it then spreads across remote areas where the governments inuence is limited; if
the rebellion in remote areas accomplishes certain success, it further expands to ar-
eas closer and even closer to the government. In geopolitical language (Mackinder
1942; Spykman 1944), ceteris paribus, a rebellion tends to expand from the periph-
ery through the rimland to the heartland as if a siege surrounding the government
gradually shrinks.22 A corollary to this implication is that geography also matters
for groupspolitical stances to the government: those in the periphery tend to be
disobedient and even hostile; those in the rimland opportunistic; those in or near the
heartland obedient or loyal.23 A caveat is that geography is not the sole factor in
determining patterns of rebel di¤usion. As discussed later, a variety of other factors
can plausibly inuence the patterns of rebellion. Nonetheless, this geographic pattern
can largely be conrmed by historical incidents as outlined in Section 5.
4.4 Numerical Example
The next numerical example conrms our intuition that the power distribution across
the rebel groups is a key determinant of the sequence of rebel movements.
If rebel  of the numerical example in Section 3.6 is split into two groups  and
 (r = 4 and r = 3), with the last rebel relabeled as , a snowballing rebellion
emerges. In the new equilibrium, where T = 10 and T = 15,  ghts with probability
22This also explains why a government often ghts for terrain with little economic value (Walter
2009). It must build a reputation of its resolve to deter additional challengers later on.
23In a related context, the distance to the states capital inuences the scope of civil war, and vice
versa (Buhaug and Gates (2002).
0.509, and  ghts with probability 0.428. If  becomes less bellicose such that w = 8,
 and  share the identical preference, so that they ght simultaneously, constituting
a catalytic rebellion.
5 Historical Incidents
To materialize our theory, we relate it to the following ve historical incidents:
Napoleonic Wars (as snowballing challenges), Boshin War (catalytic rebellion); Yu-
goslav Wars and American Civil War (partial coalition); American Revolution (full
coalition).
5.1 Napoleonic Wars: Snowballing Challenges
Our theory is applicable not only to rebellions, but also to anti-hegemonic inter-state
wars such as the Napoleonic Wars.
The abrogation of the Treaty of Amiens in 1803 is considered as the Warsonset.
Since then, Britain had been consistently hostile to France. While the British navy
won the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805, her army was not capable of solely counteracting
France on the European continent. Britain exercised her diplomatic means to contain
France in coordination with several continental powers, but France expanded her in-
uence on the continent by repulsing her challengers. France became hegemonic in the
continent, whereas Britain kept her naval supremacy (Ellis 2003: 78). To undermine
Britains interventions no the continent, Napoleon decreed the Continental Block-
ade in 1806, but pro-British Portugal objected in 1807 as did counter-revolutionary
Sweden in 1808 (Dufraisse 1991: 103-104). France forcibly brought them into the
Blockade, but the Spanish citizens rose in revolt, later supported by Britain, to over-
throw the Napoleonic monarchy (Lentz 2005: 91).
Observing France troubled with the Iberian resistance, Russia also seceded from
the Blockade and became secretly allied with Britain in 1810. To inict a punitive
charge, France invaded Russia in 1812. However, as the general frost approached,
Napoleon was forced to abandon his strategic objectives and retreated from Russia
in the winter of 1812 when Russia counterattacked and devastated the French army
(Ellis 2003: 120). Once the power balance shifted away from France, those once
allied with France shrewdly bandwagoned. Napoleons military and strategic failures
in Russia inspired Prussia, Sweden, and Austria, in turn, to declare war on France
in 1813 (Rothenberg 1999).24 The allied anti-Napoleonic powers nally accomplished
Napoleons capitulation in 1814.
To relate the Wars to our theory, it was Britain which played the key role in
instigating the continental powers into the Wars. Protected by the Strait of Dover,
Britain repeatedly took the initiative to destroy the Napoleonic hegemony jointly
with other states. Without such a geographic safeguard and her naval superiority,
Britain might have been in a riskier position.
Presumably, other statespolitical stances to France were also inuenced by ge-
ography. A general tendency perceived from the Wars is that states and regions
near France or the heartland in geopolitical language (e.g., Swiss, Holland, Rhein,
Rome, Italy) were obedient or even loyal to France, states in the rimland more op-
portunistic (Spain, Prussia, Austria), and states in the periphery disobedient or even
hostile (Britain, Portugal, Sweden, Russia). This is conceivably because those closer
to France tended to recognize her threats more real.
In addition, the Wars escalated gradually as if the challenges snowball. The
challenges were sequential, not simultaneous, as anti-Napoleonic alliances developed
during the wars, not before them (Haldi 2003: 159).25 To visualize the pattern, the
Wars spread from those farther away to those closer as if a siege shrinks (Figure 3).
This pattern is consistent with our theoretical prediction that ceteris paribus, those
stronger and farther (with a larger ri) tend to ght earlier.
5.2 Boshin War: The Imperial Court as a Coordination De-
vise
The BoshinWar (1868-1869) is one of the historical events that brought about Japans
political transition from Tokugawas feudal regime to the constitutional empire. Al-
though the War is interpreted to have begun with the Battle of Toba-Fushimi (present
Kyoto) in 1868, the initial challenge to Tokugawas regime provoke much earlier. It
was actually in 1864 when the Choshu (Yamaguchi) domain rst rose in arms (at the
24Austria was the last among the great powers to join the Wars due partly to Hapsburgs marital
bond to Napoleon since 1810.
25Napoleon himself regarded the invasion to Portugal, not to Russia, as his turning point. In
his retired life at St. Helena, Napoleon repented for the campaign in Portugal: "Cest ça qui ma
perdu." (This is what lost me.)
Kinmon incident and the rst Choshu expedition). Choshu failed these campaigns,
but the shogunates despotic policies in subsequent periods induced the Satsuma
(Kagoshima) domain to side with Choshu (Houya 2007: 9-10). In the second Choshu
expedition of 1866, Choshu dispelled the shogunates army, resulting in Tokugawas
loss of military supremacy and, in turn, the Tosa (Kochi) and Aki (Hiroshima) do-
mainsparticipation in the anti-shogunate alliance.
Echoing the emperors secret order to attack the shogunate, the alliance advanced
its armies toward Kyoto to ght the momentous Battle of Toba-Fushimi, which Toku-
gawa lost decisively. Imperial ags raised by Choshu and Satsuma during the battle
encouraged their soldiers and discouraged those of Tokugawa, demonstrating that
Tokugawa and his supporters were no longer legitimate. Choshu and Satsuma were
empowered while Tokugawa lost face (Sasaki 1994: 7, 26). With the emperors order
to chastise Tokugawa, Choshu and Satsuma demanded other domains to make the
di¢ cult decision of which side they belonged to the former shogun or the emperor
(Houya 2007: 69) but within a month after Toba-Fushimi, all local domains in the
West expressed their obedience to the new government (Houya 2007: 108). Sporadic
battles were fought around Edo (Tokyo) and in the East, but the new government
conquered the whole terrain by May 1869. In short, the war expanded from the
peripheral Southwest to the heartland of Japan (Figure 3).
Two important lessons can be drawn from this incident. First, geography matters.
Choshu, Satsuma, Tosa, and Aki were all the farthest from the Tokugawas inuence
(Edo) in their islands. Although geography is merely one of the various factors that
inuence patterns of the spread of war, it is hard to imagine that the War could
originate near Edo, where Tokugawa could crack down on rebels easily.
Second, the imperial court functioned as a coordination device across local lords to
determine their political positions. In fact, since the emperor was a religious authority
in that era, Satsuma and Choshu were eager to acquire the emperors endorsement
of their campaigns and publicize their legitimacy. Despite the fact that the emperor
lacked any military force, the emperors backup greatly inuenced the subsequent
tide of the war.
5.3 Yugoslav Wars: Partial Coordination
The Yugoslav Wars also escalated gradually but di¤erently from the two previous
cases. After Titos death in 1980, Serbia sought a hegemonic status while other regions
claimed greater autonomy. As ethnic tension became tangible, the Federation became
politically destabilized. In 1990, Slovenia held a referendum regarding independence,
whose motion was approved by the vast majority. This result stimulated Croatian
separatist movements because Slovenias independence would make Serbia even more
inuential in the Federation (Fearon 1998: 126). In contrast, Croatian separatism
would assist Slovenias independence in the sense that Croatia, as a bu¤er, could block
the Yugoslav National Armys direct invasion of Slovenias terrain. In light of this
mutual interdependence, Slovenia and Croatia arranged to declare their independence
on the same day in 1991 (Sudetic 1991a,b). In this sense, Slovenia and Croatia
coordinated their challenges.
Slovenias swift success in independence promoted separatist movements in other
republics. Macedonia seceded peacefully in 1991 (by President Gligorovs diplomatic
virtue), whereas Bosnia and Herzegovina had to ght harsh battles starting in 1992.
The Croatian and Bosnian Wars generated Serbian refugees eeing to Kosovo, raising
the tension between the Serbs and the Albanians in Kosovo (Martus 1999: 306) and
later provoking violence. Owing to NATOs tenacious air strikes (Independent Inter-
national Commission on Kosovo 2000: 5), the Kosovo War ended in 1999 when Serbia
had already lost inuence over many regions of the former Yugoslavia. Subsequently,
Montenegro seceded in 2003, and so did Kosovo in 2008, resulting in Yugoslavias
total dissolution.26
In contrast to the Napoleonic Wars and the Boshin War, where anti-hegemonic
or rebellious coalitions were developed during wars, the anti-Serbian coalition was
formed by Slovenia and Croatia before the Yugoslav Warsonset. Such strategic co-
ordination was possible presumably because they are geographically close and because
they share historical roots (i.e., former Austrian territories), religious faith (Catholi-
cism), cultural values (a Latin alphabet), economic interests (they were wealthier than
the Serbs), let alone political goals (secession). These entangled factors plausibly in-
uenced the pattern and process of the Warsdi¤usion. Another salient feature of the
Yugoslav Wars is that like in the two incidents previously discussed, challenges spread
26As of 2013, Kosovos independence remains internationally disputed.
from peripheral Slovenia and Croatia to more central Bosnia and Kosovo (Figure 3).
5.4 American Civil War: Prewar Coalition and its Expansion
As with the Yugoslav Wars, the American Civil War exhibits the properties of a par-
tially coalitional rebellion, though, unlike the Yugoslav Wars, the rebel Confederacy
utterly failed. By the outbreak of war, a subset of future rebels had formed a coali-
tion in the periphery. The original members of the Confederacy were South Carolina,
Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas all in the Deep South.
After the War broke out, four states in the Upper South joined Virginia, Arkansas,
Tennessee, and North Carolina. Fighting di¤used inward, that is, the challenges
spread from the peripheral Deep South to the more central Upper South (Figure
3). Nonetheless, some slave states along the border (Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland,
Missouri, West Virginia) did not join the Confederacy. In this regard, geography
mattered for the statespolitical stands (between the Union and the Confederacy) as
well as for the pattern of the Wars di¤usion.
5.5 American Revolution: Collective Challenge
The American Revolution constitutes a fully coalitional rebellion as we have dened
it. To secede from the British regime, thirteen colonies declared independence as a
single political unit and initiated war. The bond among the colonies was plausibly
strengthened by the facts that these colonies shared common interests and that they
were geographically contiguous but distanced away from Britain. These factors might
make it feasible for the colonies to enforce their agreements while making it di¢ cult
for Britain to appease and alienate a particular colony from the rest.
Napoleonic Wars Boshin War Yugoslav Wars American Civil War
Figure 3: Geographic di¤usion of challenges.
6 Conclusion
In this article, we have developed an intertemporal and spatial theory of rebellion that
illuminates patterns of collective challenges. The following summarizes our ndings:
 Even without strategic coordination across rebel groups, a rebellion can break
out. An instigator may promote and coordinate otherschallenges by demon-
strating in his military campaigns that there is a sizable chance to subvert
the government. In this sense, strategic coordination might gradually develop
during the rebellion, not before it.
 In contrast, if no instigator exists who is willing to solely provoke an insurgency,
rebels may seek a prewar alliance to ensure their success.
 Geographically, rebel movements tend to spread inward; i.e., a rebellion may
originate around geographic fringes and then spread toward the states capital.
This is because rebels in remote areas are more di¢ cult for the government
to suppress than those nearby. As distant rebels ght well, those closer are
inclined to bandwagon. This pattern is not addressed in the literature but
can be observed in the four wars discussed in this article (i.e., Boshin War,
Napoleonic Wars, American Civil War, Yugoslav Wars).
 Depending on the structural and geographic relations among the warring par-
ties, rebel movements may evolve in one of four patterns: a snowballing rebel-
lion; a catalytic rebellion; a partially coalitional rebellion; and a fully coalitional
rebellion (Table 1).
One of our works contributions is to advance the theoretical literature on war
widening. While the outbreak and termination of war have been formally theorized,
the escalation and spread of war has not yet been theorized in a compelling manner,
despite the growing empirical work on the topic (Haldi 2003; Walter 2009). This is in
part because of the complexity and di¢ culty with formalizing multilateral war (Jack-
son and Morelli 2011). We tackle this issue by focusing on a class of war between a
government and its adversaries in relation to geography and structure.27 Multilateral
war remains a promising theoretical research agenda.
27Apparently, geography and structure are not the only factors that determine the patterns of war
di¤usion. Looking back on the historical incidents in our discussion, other factors that potentially
inuence the shape and pattern of war might include economic interests (tax in the American Rev-
Rebellion Snowballing Catalytic Partially coalitional Fully coalitional
Pattern of challenges
Sequential
!  ! 
Suddenly escalated
! (; )
Initiated by a few
(; )! 
Simultaneous
(; ; )
Historical incidents Napoleonic Wars Boshin War
Yugoslav Wars
American Civil War
American Revolution
Glorious Revolution
Instigators
Sole
(Britain)
Sole
(Choshu Domain)
Collective
(Slovenia & Croatia)
States in the
Deep South
 All(13 colonies)
(Tories & Whigs)
Coalition Interim war
Interim war upon
a galvanizing event
Prewar among
some rebel groups
Prewar among
all rebel groups
Military capabilities Possibly heterogeneous among rebel groups
Homogeneous
among rebel groups
Geographic relations Unevenly distanced from the government
Close-by
among rebel groups
Table 1: Summary comparison.
Model pattern
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 2-(iii). If  decides to ght in period T + 1 based on s T -
round "holdout," its expected payo¤ is V IjT+1
 
holdjT

. By contrast, if  acquiesces
in T + 1, s expected payo¤ and rational decision in the subsequent period depend
on s battle outcome in T +1. If  "wins,"  should ght in T +2, and if  "loses,"
 should acquiesce permanently (Lemma 2-(i,ii)). If  "holds out,"  should ght
or acquiesce in T + 2, depending on the latest belief as to the governments strength
Pr
 
gjholdjT+1

.
When  decides to ght or not in T + 1, it estimates the payo¤ from postponing
ghting for one more period:
V IjT+2
 
holdjT
  X
g2fgL;gHg
Pr
 
gjholdjT

Pr (win [ holdjG) ( (G;)  c) ;
(A1)
for which s decision in T + 2 is to ght unless  "loses" in T + 1:
The comparison between V IjT+1
 
holdjT

and V IjT+2
 
holdjT

indicates that there
are two e¤ects of "acquiesce" in a period. The gain from "acquiesce" can be expressed
as an increase in s payo¤ by Pr
 
gH jholdjT

Pr
 
lossjGH
  
c   
 
GH;

, and
the loss expressed as a reduction by Pr
 
gLjholdjT

Pr
 
lossjGL
  

 
GL;
  c.
By Assumption 4, the gain is larger than the loss in the rst period. As s battle
continues, the gain falls, while the loss rises, because Pr
 
gH jholdjT

converges to zero
while Pr
 
gLjholdjT

converges to one. Therefore, the net benet from postponing
ghting monotonically decreases; i.e., if V IjT+1
 
holdjT

> V IjT+2
 
holdjT

, it must
be that V IjT+2
 
holdjT

> V IjT+
 
holdjT

for any   3.
This means, if one-period "acquiesce" is not worthwhile, then neither is any longer
"acquiesce." Therefore, s rational decision in a period can be derived simply by
examining the payo¤ from ghting today versus the payo¤ from ghting tomorrow.
Group  decides to ght if and only if immediate ghting is at least as good both as
perpetual acquiescing and as one-period lagged ghting:
V IjT+1
 
holdjT
  maxf0; V IjT+2  holdjT g: (A2)
olution; slavery in the American Civil War; inequality in the Yugoslav Wars), religion (Catholicism
vs. Orthodoxy in the Yugoslav Wars), past hatred (covert hostility since Sekigahara in Boshin War,
attitudes toward Nazism in the Yugoslav Wars), and even letters (Latin vs. Cyrillic in the Yugoslav
Wars).
Below we show that there exists a nite T such that Inequality (A2) holds. In
period T when the gain from "acquiesce" is smaller than the loss (i.e., V IjT+1
 
holdjT

 V IjT+2
 
holdjT

), it must be that V IjT+1
 
holdjT
  0, because Pr  lossjGH  >
Pr
 
lossjGL

in Inequality (3). Also, as T rises, the gain converges to zero, while the
loss continues to increase, so that  enters period T when "acquiesce" is no longer
worthwhile or Inequality (A2) holds. That is T.
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